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BROOKS V. STATE: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT ORAL STATEMENT MUST BE VERBATIM 
UNLESS PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED OR RATIFIED BY THE 
DECLARANT; A WITNESS’ STATEMENT SUGGESTING 
EVIDENCE CORROBORATED A COMPLAINANT’S STORY 
MAY BE HARMLESS ERROR IF NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY 
TRUTHFULNESS; SEPARATE CHARGES MUST BE MERGED 
FOR SENTENCING IF NOT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BASED ON 
DIFFERENT ACTS. 
 
By: Stephanie Lurz 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a witness may not be 
impeached with evidence of a prior inconsistent oral statement unless the 
evidence is substantially verbatim or has previously been adopted or ratified 
by the witness as an accurate summary of their prior oral statement.  Brooks v. 
State, 439 Md. 698, 98 A.3d 236 (2014).  The court also held that a statement 
of a witness suggesting that a physical examination of the complainant was 
consistent with the complainant’s story does not necessarily imply that the 
complainant’s story was truthful.  Id. at 702, 98 A.3d at 238. Finally, if the 
facts are unclear as to whether a jury’s verdicts on separate charges are based 
on different acts, the convictions must be merged for the purposes of 
sentencing.  Id. 
     One evening, Laura B. awakened to find Wendall Monroe Brooks, a 
handyman who worked for Laura B. in the past, standing beside her bed. He 
demanded that she have sex with him.  When she refused, he beat and choked 
her.  Laura B. stated she would comply with his demands if she could take a 
break.  She went downstairs and he followed her around the house.  After a 
few minutes, they returned to the bedroom where he raped her.  This continued 
until she was eventually able to call the police, who dispatched officers to the 
scene.  The first officer to arrive, Deputy Faby, spoke to Laura B. and took 
notes, which he later used to write a police report.  In his report, Deputy Faby 
stated that Laura B. indicated she invited Brooks into her home.  She was 
transported to the hospital, where a forensic nurse examined her.  
     During the trial, the defense moved to admit Deputy Faby’s police report 
into evidence to impeach Laura B. on her testimony that she awoke to find 
Brooks in her home, uninvited.  The trial court denied the motion.  The defense 
also objected to the statement of the forensic nurse that Laura B.’s injuries 
“would verify” her testimony. The trial court overruled the defense’s 
objection.  Id. 
     After a five-day trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Brooks was 
convicted of first-degree rape, false imprisonment, and other related crimes.  
He was sentenced to life imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended for 
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first-degree rape.  Brooks was also sentenced to a consecutive forty-year 
sentence for false imprisonment, with all but twenty years suspended.  Brooks 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed.  
Brooks filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted. 
     The court began its analysis by determining whether the trial court should 
have admitted Deputy Faby’s police report into evidence.  Brooks, 439 Md. at 
709, 98 A.3d at 242.  Maryland Rule 5-616 permits both testimonial and 
written extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent oral statement for 
impeachment purposes.  Id. 439 Md. at 715-16, 98 A.3d at 245-46.  Rule 5-
613 provides that such evidence may be admitted if the declarant: (1) is made 
aware of the statement’s content and circumstances under which it was made; 
(2) is given the opportunity to admit or deny the statement; (3) has not admitted 
to making the statement; and (4) the statement concerns a non-collateral 
matter.  Id. at 717, 38 A.3d at 246-47.  The court acknowledged that these 
requirements were met in this case.  Id. However, under common law, written 
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement must be a verbatim version 
or otherwise signed or adopted by the declarant.  Id. at 719-720, 98 A.3d at 
247-248.  As the defense did not establish Deputy Faby’s report to be a 
substantially verbatim version of Laura B.’s statement or that she adopted it, 
the court held that the police report was properly excluded.  Id. at 727, 98.  The 
court noted that if the defense had, in the alternative, elected to use Deputy 
Faby’s testimony in lieu of his report, it would have been admissible under 
Rule 5-613(b). Id. at 718, 98 A.3d at 247.3d at 253. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland then considered the question of whether 
the trial court properly admitted the nurse’s statement.  Brooks, 439 Md. at 
727, 98 A.3d at 253.  Previously, the court held that “a witness, expert or 
otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling 
the truth.”  Id. at 730, 98 A.3d at 254 (quoting Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 
278, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988)).  In its analysis, the court recognized that the 
prosecutor’s question of whether Laura B.’s statements were consistent with 
her injuries was appropriate.  However, the nurse’s response that the injuries 
“would verify” what Laura B. told her could suggest an evaluation of Laura 
B.’s truthfulness.  Id. at 734, 98 A.3d at 256.  The court reasoned that the 
nurse’s use of the word “would” before “verify” implied that her statement 
was intended to suggest the injuries were consistent with her knowledge of 
what happened, not that Laura B.’s story was truthful.  Id. at 734, 98 A.3d at 
256-57.  The court also noted that even if the trial court erred by not striking 
the nurse’s response, it would be harmless error, given the weight of the other 
evidence.  Id. at 736, 98 A.3d at 258.   
     The court concluded its analysis by addressing whether the trial court 
should have merged the false imprisonment conviction with the first-degree 
rape conviction for sentencing purposes.  Brooks, 439 Md. at 736-7, 98 A.3d 
at 258.  The court noted the paramount purpose of merging convictions is to 
protect the defendant from double jeopardy in accordance with the Fifth 
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Amendment and Maryland common law.  Id. at 737, 98 A.3d at 258 (citing 
Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385, 400, 44 A.3d 396 (2012)).  The protections 
require the merger of sentences if two conditions are met: (1) the convictions 
are based on the same act or acts; and (2) according to the required evidence 
rule, the offenses are essentially the same or one offense is a lesser-included 
offense of the other.  Id. at 737, 98 A.3d at 258 (citing State v. Lancaster, 332 
Md. 385, 391, 631 A.2d 453 (1993)). 
     The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland previously held that false 
imprisonment merges into a rape conviction, as the three elements of false 
imprisonment are also elements of first-degree rape.  Brooks, 439 Md. at 737-
38, 98 A.3d at 258-59 (citing Hawkins v. State, 34 Md. App. 82, 92, 366 A.2d 
421 (1976)).  However, the court also noted “confinement after or before the 
rape is committed would preclude the merger.”  Id. (quoting Hawkins, 34 Md. 
App. at 92, 366 A.2d at 421).  In this case, the basis for the jury’s decision was 
not apparent.  Id. at 739, 98 A.3d at 260. 
     Laura B. testified that Brooks threatened and attacked her before he raped 
her and followed her throughout the house, refusing to let her leave, after he 
raped her.  Brooks, 439 Md. at 739, 98 A.3d at 259-60.  This could support the 
notion that the false imprisonment charges stem from acts that occurred before 
or after the rape.  Id.  However, the prosecutor insinuated during closing 
arguments that the false imprisonment began when Brooks first appeared in 
Laura B’s bedroom.  Id. at 741, 98 A.3d at 261.  The court stated it must 
resolve such ambiguities of fact in the defendant’s favor, and held that the false 
imprisonment conviction should have been merged with the first-degree rape 
conviction.  Id. at 741, 98 A.3d at 262.  
     In Brooks v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed two 
decisions of the lower courts.  First, it affirmed the decision to disallow non-
verbatim extrinsic evidence to be used as evidence of an un-adopted prior 
inconsistent statement.  The court also allowed the statement of a witness 
suggesting that a physical exam verified the story of the complaining witness, 
holding that the statement did not necessarily imply the truthfulness of the 
complainant’s story.  However, the court reversed the decision of the lower 
court not to merge separate charges because the record did not show that the 
jury based its verdict on separate acts of the defendant.   
     Attorneys should note that prior inconsistent oral statements made to police 
officers will likely be allowed into evidence through the officer’s testimony 
but not allowed to be admitted into evidence through police reports.  Attorneys 
should also encourage expert witnesses to restate their answers if their initial 
response to a question during the trial could be perceived as pertaining to the 
truthfulness of the complaining witness, especially if the other evidence is 
insufficient to render the statement as a harmless error.  Finally, prosecutors 
seeking separate sentences for rape and false imprisonment must be careful to 
establish the separate acts constituting those crimes 
